As the media spotlight remains fixed on the uprisings taking place in “rogue states” Libya and Syria, a quiet revolution appears to be occurring in the western-friendly monarchical regimes of Morocco and Jordan. In each of these countries, a robust protest movement has 
been calling for significant political reforms, and the regime has responded with what appears to be earth-shaking proposals.
While the protesters have not been demanding the now famous “downfall of the regime” – essentially the overthrow of family rule – they have been calling for reforms that essentially seek the same thing: transforming the regime into a constitutional monarchy with the king as royal figurehead. The protesters seem to envision a political system whereby the majority of political power rests in a freely elected parliament and prime minister, relatively unhindered by royal interference.
In Jordan, King Abdullah recently announced reforms that would result in “fairness and transparency in the electoral process” and a “Parliament with active political party representation… that allows the formation of governments based on parliamentary majority…”
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI proposed constitutional changes that would significantly reduce his powers. The reforms are meant to ensure that the government is formed from the majority party, while taking the power to appoint government officials and to dissolve parliament away from the king. The proposed reforms are to be voted upon in a national referendum on July 1.
These reforms have been hailed as nothing short of revolutionary, by many observers both inside and outside the region. But how revolutionary are they?
In the case of Morocco, where the proposed reforms are set to be voted upon and – if approved – implemented in a matter of a few months, questions remain regarding the king’s ability to manipulate politics. Critics called the proposed constitutional changes “cosmetic” and pointed to the king’s position in the new constitution as head of state and head of the military – a politically and strategically important position, as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have shown. The text of the reforms does not back up the promise of a limited constitutional monarchy, according to some, as it is “drowned” in a sea of qualifiers. Since the political parties are weak and beholden to the king, any promise to give parties the lead in politics may simply obscure the unchanged role of royal maneuvering behind the scenes.
In the case of Jordan, King Abdullah’s after-the-fact clarifications indicated that his proposed reforms would not come into effect for two to three years, after Jordan’s political parties had time to “mature” and consolidate into two or three main parties. This has led to charges from critics that the proposal is merely a delaying tactic, or at best, a means to control the process to ensure that the opposition he must work with is sufficiently pliable.
Even if Abdullah’s reforms are implemented, critics expect a continued underrepresentation of leftists and Islamists in Jordan’s parliament, a long-standing tradition in the royal politics of the country.
However, how realistic is it to expect the country’s 33 political parties t0 consolidate into two or three main parties in the absence of institutional inducements to do so? As students of politics observe, different electoral systems and arrangements result in quite different political party systems. Where a single winner is selected from a district by majority/plurality vote, as in the United States, parties have an incentive to merge and ideologies tend toward the center. Other electoral methods may have different outcomes, like the well-known proportional representation system in which multiple winners are elected from a single or few country-wide districts based on their party’s percentage of the vote garnered in the election. Here, the tendency is for multiple parties to exist, as a party may gain seats with a relatively small percentage of votes. In non-democratic systems or hybrid regimes, parties serve different functions than representing constituents views. This has been aptly illustrated in the case of Jordan by Ellen Lust-Okar.
The point here is that can we expect Jordan’s political parties to organically merge simply because they are told to do so? And if they do, will they be able to transform themselves from instruments of patronage to instruments of national representation? Political scientists would look to the institutional arrangements for clues as to the likelihood of these things happening, but alas, we have no concrete details to examine. Even more disheartening is the fact that King Abdullah apparently expects party transformation to precede the constitutional reforms, not follow them. Unfortunately, I am skeptical of this succeeding.
Although it seems that the reforms proposed in Jordan and Morocco have bedazzled the eyes of western observers, it does not appear to me that the region has found a peaceful “royal road to democracy.”
In both cases, King Abdullah and Mohammed VI seem to want to defuse international and moderate domestic critics while keeping the lion’s share of power in royal family hands. While the reforms, in the long run, may represent a step forward, it is only a small step forward in what may be a very long journey ahead.
been calling for significant political reforms, and the regime has responded with what appears to be earth-shaking proposals. While the protesters have not been demanding the now famous “downfall of the regime” – essentially the overthrow of family rule – they have been calling for reforms that essentially seek the same thing: transforming the regime into a constitutional monarchy with the king as royal figurehead. The protesters seem to envision a political system whereby the majority of political power rests in a freely elected parliament and prime minister, relatively unhindered by royal interference.
In Jordan, King Abdullah recently announced reforms that would result in “fairness and transparency in the electoral process” and a “Parliament with active political party representation… that allows the formation of governments based on parliamentary majority…”
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI proposed constitutional changes that would significantly reduce his powers. The reforms are meant to ensure that the government is formed from the majority party, while taking the power to appoint government officials and to dissolve parliament away from the king. The proposed reforms are to be voted upon in a national referendum on July 1.
These reforms have been hailed as nothing short of revolutionary, by many observers both inside and outside the region. But how revolutionary are they?
In the case of Morocco, where the proposed reforms are set to be voted upon and – if approved – implemented in a matter of a few months, questions remain regarding the king’s ability to manipulate politics. Critics called the proposed constitutional changes “cosmetic” and pointed to the king’s position in the new constitution as head of state and head of the military – a politically and strategically important position, as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have shown. The text of the reforms does not back up the promise of a limited constitutional monarchy, according to some, as it is “drowned” in a sea of qualifiers. Since the political parties are weak and beholden to the king, any promise to give parties the lead in politics may simply obscure the unchanged role of royal maneuvering behind the scenes.
In the case of Jordan, King Abdullah’s after-the-fact clarifications indicated that his proposed reforms would not come into effect for two to three years, after Jordan’s political parties had time to “mature” and consolidate into two or three main parties. This has led to charges from critics that the proposal is merely a delaying tactic, or at best, a means to control the process to ensure that the opposition he must work with is sufficiently pliable.
Even if Abdullah’s reforms are implemented, critics expect a continued underrepresentation of leftists and Islamists in Jordan’s parliament, a long-standing tradition in the royal politics of the country.
However, how realistic is it to expect the country’s 33 political parties t0 consolidate into two or three main parties in the absence of institutional inducements to do so? As students of politics observe, different electoral systems and arrangements result in quite different political party systems. Where a single winner is selected from a district by majority/plurality vote, as in the United States, parties have an incentive to merge and ideologies tend toward the center. Other electoral methods may have different outcomes, like the well-known proportional representation system in which multiple winners are elected from a single or few country-wide districts based on their party’s percentage of the vote garnered in the election. Here, the tendency is for multiple parties to exist, as a party may gain seats with a relatively small percentage of votes. In non-democratic systems or hybrid regimes, parties serve different functions than representing constituents views. This has been aptly illustrated in the case of Jordan by Ellen Lust-Okar.
The point here is that can we expect Jordan’s political parties to organically merge simply because they are told to do so? And if they do, will they be able to transform themselves from instruments of patronage to instruments of national representation? Political scientists would look to the institutional arrangements for clues as to the likelihood of these things happening, but alas, we have no concrete details to examine. Even more disheartening is the fact that King Abdullah apparently expects party transformation to precede the constitutional reforms, not follow them. Unfortunately, I am skeptical of this succeeding.
Although it seems that the reforms proposed in Jordan and Morocco have bedazzled the eyes of western observers, it does not appear to me that the region has found a peaceful “royal road to democracy.”
In both cases, King Abdullah and Mohammed VI seem to want to defuse international and moderate domestic critics while keeping the lion’s share of power in royal family hands. While the reforms, in the long run, may represent a step forward, it is only a small step forward in what may be a very long journey ahead.
At the same time, I was only too aware that he is a savvy politician, like all the others, and a newbie to boot. That's why I didn't rush out and immediately proclaim Obama our Savior. He may be The One, at least to many, but it isn't too hard for a jaded, grizzled, political scientist like me to see the signs of carefully constructed image-making in progress.
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