Anyone watching the events in Tunisia today has to be thrilled by the magnitude of what has apparently happened. An autocrat firmly entrenched in power for 23 years in a country widely thought to be among the most prosperous and stable was chased from power by massive street demonstrations. Rulers in neighboring Arab countries who refuse to relinquish power in their own countries, despite high unemployment and rising discontent, almost certainly are watching Tunisia with great concern for what could eventually come to their own shores.
Despite the euphoria, the political scientist in me is asking many questions: why did this happen now, and not six months ago or two years ago? And what’s next? Will the protesters’ calls for greater democracy, transparency, and economic equality be heeded by the new leaders?
It’s not at all clear that the interim leader, Mohammed Ghannouchi, will steer a new course entirely different from his predecessor, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. He is described as a “yes man” (or more correctly, “Mr. Oui Oui”) by Blake Hounshell on Foreign Policy’s blog for always saying “yes” to Ben Ali. The Tunisian people will have to change the familiar course of history to influence the new regime in the direction it wants to go. This is not an easy proposition, given that Tunisia’s opposition is generally characterized as weak and fragmented from years of Ben Ali’s cooptation and repression.
This brings me to a second point, which is “why now"?” Tunisia seems an unlikely candidate for a people power revolution, particularly given the weakness of its opposition movements. In fact, Tunisia is held up as an example of successful opposition exclusion and repression – and therefore thwarted rebellion – in one of my favorite books explaining revolutions and revolts, Why Muslims Rebel by Mohammed Hafez. Now, I think, Dr. Hafez has some splainin’ to do.
But Hafez’s book and others in the same political process tradition are very good at asking and answering the question of “why now?” about rebellions. By looking at the nature of political institutions, regime practices and opposition organizations, we can get a better understanding of the conditions that allow successful (variously defined) rebellions to form and flourish.
Most of the news reports have pointed to youth discontent over unemployment, corruption, and lack of freedom in Tunisia as the cause for the rebellions. I remain unconvinced that this is the strongest explanation for what is happening. While discontent is never irrelevant, it is unlikely to explain why this is happening now rather than a year ago. Was discontent substantially lower a year ago? Two months ago? I doubt it.
So I am planning to look a little deeper than the standard explanations to the nature of opposition organizations and (more likely) to the opportunities for opposition mobilization presented by the regime as it slowly weakened and lost its grip on power. I’ll keep ya posted.
Despite the euphoria, the political scientist in me is asking many questions: why did this happen now, and not six months ago or two years ago? And what’s next? Will the protesters’ calls for greater democracy, transparency, and economic equality be heeded by the new leaders?It’s not at all clear that the interim leader, Mohammed Ghannouchi, will steer a new course entirely different from his predecessor, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. He is described as a “yes man” (or more correctly, “Mr. Oui Oui”) by Blake Hounshell on Foreign Policy’s blog for always saying “yes” to Ben Ali. The Tunisian people will have to change the familiar course of history to influence the new regime in the direction it wants to go. This is not an easy proposition, given that Tunisia’s opposition is generally characterized as weak and fragmented from years of Ben Ali’s cooptation and repression.
This brings me to a second point, which is “why now"?” Tunisia seems an unlikely candidate for a people power revolution, particularly given the weakness of its opposition movements. In fact, Tunisia is held up as an example of successful opposition exclusion and repression – and therefore thwarted rebellion – in one of my favorite books explaining revolutions and revolts, Why Muslims Rebel by Mohammed Hafez. Now, I think, Dr. Hafez has some splainin’ to do.
But Hafez’s book and others in the same political process tradition are very good at asking and answering the question of “why now?” about rebellions. By looking at the nature of political institutions, regime practices and opposition organizations, we can get a better understanding of the conditions that allow successful (variously defined) rebellions to form and flourish.
Most of the news reports have pointed to youth discontent over unemployment, corruption, and lack of freedom in Tunisia as the cause for the rebellions. I remain unconvinced that this is the strongest explanation for what is happening. While discontent is never irrelevant, it is unlikely to explain why this is happening now rather than a year ago. Was discontent substantially lower a year ago? Two months ago? I doubt it.
So I am planning to look a little deeper than the standard explanations to the nature of opposition organizations and (more likely) to the opportunities for opposition mobilization presented by the regime as it slowly weakened and lost its grip on power. I’ll keep ya posted.
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