Primary Election Day in GA

It is primary election day in Georgia, and do you know who your candidates are? Primary elections are notoriously low-profile and confusing for voters, which explains their traditionally low turnout rate. Here are a few tools for those of you who are motivated to get informed about the candidates in today's elections.

1. An interactive voter guide by the AJC and League of Women Voters. Here, you can customize the ballot by zip code/address and by political party. The LWV questionnaires filled out by the candidates are available for side-by-side comparison for each race. At the end, you can print out your sample ballot to bring with you to the polling place.

2. PolitiFact Georgia, the Georgia edition of PolitiFact.com, attempts to sort through the political rhetoric by labeling political claims made by politicians on their "Truth-O-Meter" somewhere between "true" and "false" - including "half true," "mostly true" and "barely true."

3. For local information, the Athens Banner-Herald has its Election Central webpage, which is quite simple compared to the AJC. It mainly lists the candidates by race and includes some basic information (age, education, campaign website). However, the sidebar lists recent election articles by the ABH, many of which have a local flavor.

Happy Voting!

“The Sorrowful Decline of the Arabs”

“The Sorrowful Decline of the Arabs”: "

"In the Wall Street Journal, Fouad Ajami writes today that the vibrant display of political activism in Iran since its elections highlights the relative “stagnation” of politics in the Arab world. He writes that the recent UN Arab Human Development Report dissects the condition of the Arab state and sadly recognizes that despite oil wealth, the region has an autocratic political culture, high unemployment, floundering economies and widespread poverty. States have failed their people, contends Ajami, but leaders have nevertheless become masters of personal political survival, which is reinforced by shortcomings in strong opposition movements, the middle class, and power of property the private sector.

Ajami is critical of the UN Arab Human Development Report’s authors, but narrows his argument to criticize a new American policy in the Middle East under President Obama. This policy values the status quo over the “risks of liberty,” he writes, and misses opportunities at supporting democracy." (Project on Middle East Democracy)

One of the most notable things about the Iranian Uprising is the relative quiet in the Arab world. Even the Egyptian Kefeya movement cannot mobilize more than a few dozen protesters, while Iranian dissenters were able to fill the streets with thousands. One could speculate as to the reasons for the difference. Ajami seems to imply it is cultural, as if the Arabs were somehow incompetent or growing more impotent without Washington's prodding. In fact, if one were to draw any conclusions about American influence, it might be the opposite: where American influence is the weakest (Iran) democratic impulses are the strongest. Only where American influence props up dictators and stifles civil society do popular movements fail.

Tehran Tienanmen?

Unfortunately, it looks like Time's option #2 is the most likely outcome in Iran now. Although it is not clear how violent the crackdown on the protests has been, it appears that the clerical regime is in no mood to negotiate or compromise with the opposition. The distressing video of Neda, who was killed before cell phone video cameras, shows that the authorities have at least some of the time used excessive force. Since the top and middle layers of organizers appear to have been arrested, the protests seem to be losing momentum. Twitter alone cannot organize a revolution.

Sad as it sounds, I fear that the wind is out of the sails. Even if that is so, I believe that many of us will not look at the people of Iran in the same light.

Khamenei Throws Down the Gauntlet

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei today warned protesters to stay off the streets and denied accusations that last Friday's elections were rigged. In a Friday prayer session attended by overflowing crowds at Tehran University, he said he would never give in to "illegal pressures" and warned of bloodshed if protests continued. According to the New York Times website, the government has already begun denying permits for opposition rallies.

It appears that this move is meant to break what looked like a growing deadlock and raise the stakes in the emerging political game. He has effectively dared the opposition to move. It doesn't seem likely that such a large and mobilized movement will be easily intimidated. However, the prospect of violence is very real if demonstrations continue. After that it is anyone's guess how the rest of the game plays out.

Endgame?

Speculation about how the crisis in Iran will turn out is rampant. As one analyst remarks on the Foreign Policy website, "Predictions about Iran are a dime a dozen these days. And that's exactly they are worth."

Time Magazine outlines four possible endgame scenarios:
1. Revolution 2.0 - A repeat of the 1979 Revolution that brought down the Shah.

2. A Tehran Tiananmen? - A bloody crackdown that (roughly) restores the status quo.

3. Khamenei's Divine Retreat - The Ayatollah convinces the Guardian Council to order a new vote or to "adjust" the vote so that a runoff is necessary. A weakened Supreme Leader would result.

4. A Zimbabwe Option - A negotiated power-sharing arrangement or "buying-off" of select oppositionists with less important positions.

Interesting and thoughtful speculation. I would argue that option #3 is the most likely, followed by 2 and 4. However, as Charles Kurzman argues, nothing is predictable and if one makes enough predictions, something will almost certainly end up being correct. Ignore the expert predictions, in other words. He probably has made the most thoughtful predictions yet - anything could happen.

Is the Iranian Regime in Trouble?

Even though there are many parallels between the massive demonstrations occurring in Iran today and the revolution that threw out the Shah thirty years ago, it is unlikely that the current Islamic regime is in danger of imminent collapse or overthrow. As much as many of us - me included - would like to see the current regime replaced by something more democratic, it doesn't seem like that is the main aim of the protesters, or even if it was, that it would be successful. The coercive apparatus of the regime is still quite robust, and as long as it remains strong and the regime's leaders are willing to wield it against protesters, the regime structure seems relatively safe for the time being.

What appears to be behind much of the turmoil is a leadership struggle between different camps. Depending on the source, the camps can be characterized as conservative vs. reformist; conservative vs. conservative; or first vs. second generation. (See a terrific article here on the internal power struggle.) No matter how it is characterized, the various camps are all generally in favor of the Islamic Republican form of government and its broad outlines, so the winner of the struggle is not likely to initiate major changes in government structure.

However, depending on who wins, there may be changes in political substance. If Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei wins the power struggle, the many who supported Mousavi and hoped for greater freedom of expression will likely be disillusioned. Their belief in the rule of law may be dashed, since the impression is widespread that their votes were never even counted. Much like after the student riots of 1999, widespread apathy may result. This is what many in the leadership hope for - those who are trying to forestall change.

But if the students are able to extract some concessions, the toppling of the regime is unlikely, but some degree of freedoms may result. More freedom of expression, freedom for women to express themselves in dress, for example. And the expectation that the voting process will proceed in a free manner will be upheld. Keep in mind that the Iranian parliament (Majles) and presidency - elected offices - are not the most powerful in the government. The appointed and indirectly elected clerical bodies are the most powerful positions in the country, and they "supervise" the elected bodies. So even if the elected bodies were freely chosen, Iranian government would be closer to a democracy, but still not quite there.

I wish I could be more optimistic about the likelihood of widespread and radical change in Iran. And, I actually hope I am wrong. There is something inspiring about watching the struggle for freedom unfold before our eyes. We are probably projecting more into that struggle than really exists. However, if that struggle is successful, it could perhaps plant the seeds for something larger in the long run. I believe that is why the Mullahs fight.


"Mullahs - you can't kill a hashtag." - Twitter post reported anonymously on CNN 6/18/09

Obama's Dilemma

The Iranian election imbroglio has been posing a political and moral dilemma to President Obama since the results were released on Friday. There is mounting pressure on him to support the Iranian opposition, despite the fact that it would be wildly reckless and run contrary to a half century of Iranian political history.

On the issue of the veracity of the elections, it is often overlooked that President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad does have a significant base of support among Iran's poor, the religious, and in rural areas. Just because we don't like him doesn't mean Iranians don't like him. Challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi has strong support in many middle- and upper-class neighborhoods of Tehran, where many foreign press organizations operated, but it is not clear if his support was as strong elsewhere. Nevertheless, a number of now widely-reported irregularities in the elections have given many Iranians the impression that the outcome was predetermined - their votes were never counted. This impression is not to be discounted. While elected bodies in Iran may not be the most powerful, elections are nonetheless meaningful, particularly when candidates from various political stripes are allowed to contest. Many Iranians are therefore insulted at the possibility that their votes were simply cast aside. And this possibility appears to be very real, though not a proven fact.

So far, Obama has been cautious in his approach to the elections, saying only that he was "concerned" and urging Iran to respect the standards of democracy. Iran, for its part, accused the United States of "intolerable meddling" in its internal affairs. Since 1979 and before, Iran has been highly suspicious and hyper-sensitive about American interference in domestic affairs. Not that it isn't justified; in 1953, CIA covert operations were responsible for overthrowing an elected, nationalist government and (re)installing the soon-to-be-detested Shah who would later be known as one of the world's most repressive dictators. He would be overthrown in 1979 and replaced by the current form of government.

The pressure for Obama to support the protesters is understandable. The United States believes itself to be a beacon of democracy, whatever its shortcomings. We like to stand up for the values that we believe in, and it seems wrong - in a way - to allow thousands of others to put their lives on the line for the right to choose their leaders without the (self-proclaimed) global leader of democracy voicing its support, at the very least. But it is also clear that American support for the opposition can be the kiss of death. Literally. The leadership has announced that it will begin executing foreign agents and agitators, and those receiving support from abroad. It would be a very, very bad idea to give them an excuse to bring out the firing squads. Obama himself has argued against giving the Iranian regime the impression that the protests are American-led. Although the United States is concerned about the violence, he has said, it is an internal issue for the Iranians to work out. At the risk of sounding cold-hearted, the Iranians don't want our "support." It will simply be counterproductive. In this case, the best help is no help at all.