In high-tech tributes, Apple fans mourn Steve Jobs | ajc.com
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| Mourner holds up an image of a candle on an ipad at a memorial for Steve Jobs |
Thursday, October 6, 2011
A World Without Steve Jobs
A world without Steve Jobs is a little like a world without Santa Claus. He would bring us our "toys" - the sleek gadgets that are a joy to use - unveiled in his charismatic way, in front of a rapt and appreciative crowd. We adults loved Steve Jobs in the same way our kids loved Santa. No one else knew what we wanted, even when we ourselves didn't, and managed to deliver it, year after year. Who will bring us our toys now? The world has lost a little magic now that Steve Jobs is gone.
Rest in peace, Santa Jobs. The little kid in all of us will miss you.
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad
Sunday, August 21, 2011
End of the Line for Qaddhafi???
It's been a long spring and summer while the images of Egyptians and Tunisians celebrating their newly-won freedoms faded in America's notoriously short public memory. But it looks like a new victory may be upon us: Libya! While much has yet to be sorted out, the end appears to be in sight for the months-long slug-fest. Citizens of Tripoli have cowered in fear for months, but now they have come out into the streets to celebrate what appears to be their first glimpse of freedom.
If true, much hard work lies ahead for the people of Libya. Constructing a democracy on the ashes of a brutally repressive regime is not easy. Further, studies suggest that violent revolutions complicate the transitions even more than nonviolent revolutions. Having made it this far, I have confidence in the ability of the Libyan people to get it done!
Monday, July 11, 2011
Press Conference of the Peas - on Storify
Obama's press conference on the debt ceiling - marked by great metaphors about Band-Aids and eating peas. Will it do the trick?
As we wait to find out, read the Twitter comments of those watching the conference live - on Storify.
Click here to go to the Storify narrative.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
Mobilizing Dissent in Tripoli
Observers of authoritarianism are aware that one of the hardest obstacles for opposition to overcome is the unknown: the number of people unknown to opposition leaders who do not support the regime and could potentially be induced to act against it, but remain silent out of fear. If an authoritarian regime is effective in atomizing society and hindering free speech, even in private, people will be unable to gauge the extent of public dissatisfaction in existence, making opposition action seem highly risky. No one knows if a person makes a public stance, will others join and support him? (See Lisa Wedeen’s readable and informative account of this phenomenon in Syria)
In Tripoli, still under the tight grip of Moammar Qaddhafi, fear still prevails. One activist, however, is displaying his defiance in an effort to rally the citizens of Tripoli into action. In a story on CNN, he admits to burning a mural of Qaddhafi in broad daylight – a brazen act by any standards – and explains his motivations.
He said he hurled a Molotov cocktail and set one of the capital's largest Gadhafi posters afire. "It is symbolic because it is in the heart of Tripoli," he said. "It has been what some people have been calling a city devoid of opposition to Gadhafi."
According to CNN, “Niz [pseudonym of the activist] is not alone in his viewpoint: there exists in Tripoli a large, frightened group of people who oppose Gadhafi. Niz hopes to push them into action.”
It is actions like these that started the revolt in Syria. Only by starting with actions like these can people sitting on the fence or frozen in fear be motivation to action.
See the CNN story here:
Displays of Defiance in Tripoli
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Did Middle East Studies Miss the Arab Spring?
Gause hits the issue dead on regarding the first issue. Civil-military relations have indeed been low on the academic agenda in Middle Eastern studies since the spate of military coups of the 1950s and 1960s abated. There were the few, like Steven Cook, who wrote about Arab (not Turkish or Israeli) military relations, but by and large, most scholars seemed to prefer writing about social capital or other trendy issues.
In my mind, civil-military relations sounded like a boring and irrelevant subject, something that Latin American specialists did and was relevant to their region. But ever since the militaries of Tunisia and Egypt turned on their benefactors, the military of Libya fragmented, and Syria’s (apparently) remained steadfast in its loyalty to the dictator, I have come to appreciate the complexity and importance of military politics. Gause will find little argument from me on this point.
However, it is not altogether clear that had scholars focused more on civil-military relations, the events of the Arab Spring would have been less of a surprise. It would have indeed provided evidence of the fragility of these regimes, but in fact, such evidence has not been lacking. Gause’s second factor is a case in point. He argues that Middle East scholars underestimated the destabilizing effect of neoliberal economic reforms on non-oil-rich states. Two points are relevant here:
1. While Gause is probably correct in his related assertion that oil-rich states remain relatively stable, I believe that this issue needs to be investigated in light of the events in Libya and Bahrain. The uprisings in those two countries can be blamed on contingent factors, like ethnic strains or economic waste, as Gause does, but it is far from established that these contingent factors are responsible for allowing mobilization to grow much further than the regimes’ comfort levels. I will feel more comfortable in such assertions after systematic studies have been done.
2. More to the point, Gause’s argument about the destabilizing effect of neoliberal economic reforms is not news to Middle East scholars. Many scholars in fact have argued all along that the status quo was inherently destabilizing and unsustainable, whether because of the austerity of structural adjustment programs, growing corruption, unpopular American hegemony over the region, or ideologically bankrupt, authoritarian regimes. Particularly problematic (in my eyes, at least) was the exclusion of the younger generations from the “ruling bargain” of the 1950s and 1960s due to contracting state financial obligations.
After some time, it became difficult for scholars explain the persistence of these regimes, given all the reasons for discontent. Thus, the scholarly focus began to shift to authoritarian stability, not because there were no reasons to believe instability would occur, but precisely because there were so many. Scholars cannot ignore empirical reality; Mubarak’s 31 years in power, Assad’s (Hafez) 29 years and his son’s subsequent 11 years (so far), Qaddhafi’s 41 years, and so on, need to be explained given the very real expectations that such long-term authoritarian, corrupt rule would not succeed.
The question now, after the events to date of the Arab Spring, should most appropriately be “why now?” rather than focusing on why it happened in the first place. Why did the revolts occur this year, rather than last year or ten years ago? This is a much trickier question, one that could involve both contingent events and others related to systematic factors.
I think that previous research has given scholars clues as to some important factors worth investigating. The first comes from social movement scholarship, which has influenced many studies of Middle Eastern issues in recent years. Social movement scholars point to movements’ opportunities, strategies, and capacities to organize, rather than simply looking at the existence of grievances to explain variations in social movement activity. While the details have yet to fully emerge, it appears that the youth of countries like Egypt and Tunisia, and possibly others, like Syria, have been organizing for several years, not simply to voice their protest, but with the intent of carrying out a nonviolent revolution. Discontented and not beholden to their regime’s ruling bargain, the youth organized both on the ground and in cyberspace to eventually capture the imagination of a large segment of their country’s population.
This brings us to a second factor, the highly important but difficult to predict “snowball effect.” Once a critical mass of individuals are seen defying authorities (to protest, for example), others are more likely to perceive lower risk to themselves and therefore more likely to join the defiance. This is well explained by Timur Kuran in a 1991 article in World Politics, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” It is often contingent and unpredictable events, however, that are the triggering events for such snowball effects, making them difficult to predict. Making prediction even harder is the fact that citizens of authoritarian regimes have an incentive to hide their true preferences from others, out of fear of the authorities, until the snowball cascade is well underway. Despite these apparently unsystematic factors influencing the outcome, it is nevertheless apparent that some sort of cascade similar to what Kuran described has recently been at work in many countries.
Further investigation of these two factors may uncover important clues to answering the question of “why now?” While much works remains to be done, significant scholarly groundwork has been done by scholars preceding the Arab Spring, giving us much to build upon. Although it is important to look at what scholars missed before the events of the last few months, it is equally, if not more important, to look at what they did NOT miss, and use it in future scholarship on successful and unsuccessful uprisings. Scholars, while pleasantly surprised by the Arab Spring, may have missed less than we think.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
What I Think I Know about Reform in Jordan and Morocco: Two Kings’ Speeches
As the media spotlight remains fixed on the uprisings taking place in “rogue states” Libya and Syria, a quiet revolution appears to be occurring in the western-friendly monarchical regimes of Morocco and Jordan. In each of these countries, a robust protest movement has 
been calling for significant political reforms, and the regime has responded with what appears to be earth-shaking proposals.
While the protesters have not been demanding the now famous “downfall of the regime” – essentially the overthrow of family rule – they have been calling for reforms that essentially seek the same thing: transforming the regime into a constitutional monarchy with the king as royal figurehead. The protesters seem to envision a political system whereby the majority of political power rests in a freely elected parliament and prime minister, relatively unhindered by royal interference.
In Jordan, King Abdullah recently announced reforms that would result in “fairness and transparency in the electoral process” and a “Parliament with active political party representation… that allows the formation of governments based on parliamentary majority…”
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI proposed constitutional changes that would significantly reduce his powers. The reforms are meant to ensure that the government is formed from the majority party, while taking the power to appoint government officials and to dissolve parliament away from the king. The proposed reforms are to be voted upon in a national referendum on July 1.
These reforms have been hailed as nothing short of revolutionary, by many observers both inside and outside the region. But how revolutionary are they?
In the case of Morocco, where the proposed reforms are set to be voted upon and – if approved – implemented in a matter of a few months, questions remain regarding the king’s ability to manipulate politics. Critics called the proposed constitutional changes “cosmetic” and pointed to the king’s position in the new constitution as head of state and head of the military – a politically and strategically important position, as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have shown. The text of the reforms does not back up the promise of a limited constitutional monarchy, according to some, as it is “drowned” in a sea of qualifiers. Since the political parties are weak and beholden to the king, any promise to give parties the lead in politics may simply obscure the unchanged role of royal maneuvering behind the scenes.
In the case of Jordan, King Abdullah’s after-the-fact clarifications indicated that his proposed reforms would not come into effect for two to three years, after Jordan’s political parties had time to “mature” and consolidate into two or three main parties. This has led to charges from critics that the proposal is merely a delaying tactic, or at best, a means to control the process to ensure that the opposition he must work with is sufficiently pliable.
Even if Abdullah’s reforms are implemented, critics expect a continued underrepresentation of leftists and Islamists in Jordan’s parliament, a long-standing tradition in the royal politics of the country.
However, how realistic is it to expect the country’s 33 political parties t0 consolidate into two or three main parties in the absence of institutional inducements to do so? As students of politics observe, different electoral systems and arrangements result in quite different political party systems. Where a single winner is selected from a district by majority/plurality vote, as in the United States, parties have an incentive to merge and ideologies tend toward the center. Other electoral methods may have different outcomes, like the well-known proportional representation system in which multiple winners are elected from a single or few country-wide districts based on their party’s percentage of the vote garnered in the election. Here, the tendency is for multiple parties to exist, as a party may gain seats with a relatively small percentage of votes. In non-democratic systems or hybrid regimes, parties serve different functions than representing constituents views. This has been aptly illustrated in the case of Jordan by Ellen Lust-Okar.
The point here is that can we expect Jordan’s political parties to organically merge simply because they are told to do so? And if they do, will they be able to transform themselves from instruments of patronage to instruments of national representation? Political scientists would look to the institutional arrangements for clues as to the likelihood of these things happening, but alas, we have no concrete details to examine. Even more disheartening is the fact that King Abdullah apparently expects party transformation to precede the constitutional reforms, not follow them. Unfortunately, I am skeptical of this succeeding.
Although it seems that the reforms proposed in Jordan and Morocco have bedazzled the eyes of western observers, it does not appear to me that the region has found a peaceful “royal road to democracy.”
In both cases, King Abdullah and Mohammed VI seem to want to defuse international and moderate domestic critics while keeping the lion’s share of power in royal family hands. While the reforms, in the long run, may represent a step forward, it is only a small step forward in what may be a very long journey ahead.
been calling for significant political reforms, and the regime has responded with what appears to be earth-shaking proposals. While the protesters have not been demanding the now famous “downfall of the regime” – essentially the overthrow of family rule – they have been calling for reforms that essentially seek the same thing: transforming the regime into a constitutional monarchy with the king as royal figurehead. The protesters seem to envision a political system whereby the majority of political power rests in a freely elected parliament and prime minister, relatively unhindered by royal interference.
In Jordan, King Abdullah recently announced reforms that would result in “fairness and transparency in the electoral process” and a “Parliament with active political party representation… that allows the formation of governments based on parliamentary majority…”
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI proposed constitutional changes that would significantly reduce his powers. The reforms are meant to ensure that the government is formed from the majority party, while taking the power to appoint government officials and to dissolve parliament away from the king. The proposed reforms are to be voted upon in a national referendum on July 1.
These reforms have been hailed as nothing short of revolutionary, by many observers both inside and outside the region. But how revolutionary are they?
In the case of Morocco, where the proposed reforms are set to be voted upon and – if approved – implemented in a matter of a few months, questions remain regarding the king’s ability to manipulate politics. Critics called the proposed constitutional changes “cosmetic” and pointed to the king’s position in the new constitution as head of state and head of the military – a politically and strategically important position, as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have shown. The text of the reforms does not back up the promise of a limited constitutional monarchy, according to some, as it is “drowned” in a sea of qualifiers. Since the political parties are weak and beholden to the king, any promise to give parties the lead in politics may simply obscure the unchanged role of royal maneuvering behind the scenes.
In the case of Jordan, King Abdullah’s after-the-fact clarifications indicated that his proposed reforms would not come into effect for two to three years, after Jordan’s political parties had time to “mature” and consolidate into two or three main parties. This has led to charges from critics that the proposal is merely a delaying tactic, or at best, a means to control the process to ensure that the opposition he must work with is sufficiently pliable.
Even if Abdullah’s reforms are implemented, critics expect a continued underrepresentation of leftists and Islamists in Jordan’s parliament, a long-standing tradition in the royal politics of the country.
However, how realistic is it to expect the country’s 33 political parties t0 consolidate into two or three main parties in the absence of institutional inducements to do so? As students of politics observe, different electoral systems and arrangements result in quite different political party systems. Where a single winner is selected from a district by majority/plurality vote, as in the United States, parties have an incentive to merge and ideologies tend toward the center. Other electoral methods may have different outcomes, like the well-known proportional representation system in which multiple winners are elected from a single or few country-wide districts based on their party’s percentage of the vote garnered in the election. Here, the tendency is for multiple parties to exist, as a party may gain seats with a relatively small percentage of votes. In non-democratic systems or hybrid regimes, parties serve different functions than representing constituents views. This has been aptly illustrated in the case of Jordan by Ellen Lust-Okar.
The point here is that can we expect Jordan’s political parties to organically merge simply because they are told to do so? And if they do, will they be able to transform themselves from instruments of patronage to instruments of national representation? Political scientists would look to the institutional arrangements for clues as to the likelihood of these things happening, but alas, we have no concrete details to examine. Even more disheartening is the fact that King Abdullah apparently expects party transformation to precede the constitutional reforms, not follow them. Unfortunately, I am skeptical of this succeeding.
Although it seems that the reforms proposed in Jordan and Morocco have bedazzled the eyes of western observers, it does not appear to me that the region has found a peaceful “royal road to democracy.”
In both cases, King Abdullah and Mohammed VI seem to want to defuse international and moderate domestic critics while keeping the lion’s share of power in royal family hands. While the reforms, in the long run, may represent a step forward, it is only a small step forward in what may be a very long journey ahead.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
What in the $%^#$ is Going on in Yemen?
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| Protesters demand the ouster of President Saleh during a rally in Sanaa on June 4 |
It has been dismaying to see Yemen plunge into violence after the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt were successful in removing entrenched leaders without the use of opposition violence. In Yemen, the protesters remain peaceful, like their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, even in the face of government violence. However, long-time tribal rivals, sensing an upcoming transition of power and smarting from years of discontent over division of political spoils, have begun using the peaceful opposition as a springboard for their own ambitions, not all of which are peaceful - as can be seen from the violence wracking Yemen in the last two weeks. Now, however, the departure of Saleh has provided a new opening for transition (perhaps) under which transition to new leadership may begin.
Photo: Reuters
Monday, June 6, 2011
Naksa Day
| photo:Reuters |
At any rate, I have compiled some interesting tweets by bloggers, activists, and photographers into a storify narrative - it shows the inside view of the day's events from a few of those who were there. Enjoy!
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Obama's 'Arab Spring' Speech, Storified
I have discovered Storify, the website where you can piece together tweets and other multimedia to tell a "story," in this case, all the liveblogging of Obama's speech. I only captured a small bit of it, but here is my effort so far:
Obama's Mideast Speech on Storify
Here is one by the Washington Post as well. Very professionally done but without much of the color commentary that makes this sort of thing interesting.
Enjoy!
Obama's Mideast Speech on Storify
Here is one by the Washington Post as well. Very professionally done but without much of the color commentary that makes this sort of thing interesting.
Enjoy!
Thursday, March 10, 2011
Is the US Still the Global Leader??
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| Photo: Scott Nelson/NYT via WcP Watchful.Eye's blog |
The Bush Administration had no fear as it charged ahead with the invasion of Iraq, despite international misgivings. Now, as Libyans beg for international assistance, the United States seems willing to engage only if others take the lead. As Thomas Ricks says in his Foreign Policy blog, "the American position is that it will support NATO action if one of those three entities [Arab League, African Union, UN] agrees to take the lead."
The US has used up its international political capital in the misguided Iraq war. Now, it must be wary of "regional sensitivities" as it considers Libyan intervention. How sad it is that when US global leadership is needed, we are incapable of rising to the occasion. Constrained by our past actions and reputation, we no longer should call ourselves the beacon of freedom if we cannot assist the forces of freedom when it matters.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Freedom for Egyptians Only?
As dictators across the Middle East open fire on nonviolent citizen protesters, the US 
remains on the sidelines. Bahrain, Algeria, and Libya have clamped down on media coverage, making these uprisings are much less visible to everyday Americans than the Egyptian uprising, which garnered 24/7 news coverage during its peak.
Protesters putting their lives on the line should not feel abandoned. While they are indigenous, capable movements, they are at the mercy of their police and military establishments. In Bahrain and especially Libya, the relative “restraint” shown by Egypt appear to have been abandoned. The message learned from Egypt: crack down hard and early, before protests become too large.
I hope the Obama administration is not intimidated by the importance of the 5th Fleet’s home in Bahrain. No amount of blood is worth a naval base, even one that serves to pressure Iran and safeguard important oil shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. The US should make it clear that we stand up for the rights of all who desire freedom, even those with the unfortunate bad luck of living where we have placed an important naval base.
Freedom is for all, not just a chosen few.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
The "Leaderless, Spontaneous" Revolution that Wasn't
I expressed my doubts in a previous post, and said I would update as my understanding of the situation developed. Now I can (briefly) update with some additional information.
Newsbreak: The revolution was not leaderless. It simply didn't have a "face" already known to western media, like Mohamed AlBaradei. Instead, young leaders eschewed the media limelight. Organizing, not posturing, seemed to be their main task.
More: Twitter and Facebook did not "make" this revolution; people did. Their hard work organizing people on the ground is what made this happen.
More on all this later, but for now, I'll simply post a few links to essential reading on the details of my argument.
Wired and Shrewd, Young Egyptians Guide Revolt
An Egyptian and Tunisian Link that Shook History
Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students who Ovethrew Milosevic
The Hopeful Network: Meet the Young Cyberactivists who have been Planning Egypt's Revolution for Years
Sunday, February 13, 2011
AP News: Mubarak's final hours: Desperate bids to stay
AP News: Mubarak's final hours: Desperate bids to stay
AP news has written a fascinating account of (former) Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's last attempts to cling to power. According to the article, which quotes "a senior Egyptian official, editors and journalists from state newspapers close to the regime who have spent years covering Mubarak's presidency, retired army generals in contact with top active duty officers, senior members of Mubarak's National Democratic Party and analysts familiar with the machinations of Mubarak's inner circle", Mubarak was expected by the military and top members of the ruling NDP party to resign in his speech Thursday night. Instead, in a bid to ride out the protests - as his son Gamal Mubarak and inner circle of advisors suggested - he offered a few concessions but did not resign. It only enraged the protesters, who came out in greater numbers the next day to Tahrir square, the Presidential palace, and the Radio and Television building. As the protests grew, the military moved decisively to take power directly.
If true, the account explains why the world was taken by surprise by Mubarak's speech Thursday evening and the conflicting signals given out throughout the day. It all points to the unique stubbornness of one man, who finally managed to be pushed aside so a New Egypt could emerge.
If true, the account explains why the world was taken by surprise by Mubarak's speech Thursday evening and the conflicting signals given out throughout the day. It all points to the unique stubbornness of one man, who finally managed to be pushed aside so a New Egypt could emerge.
Friday, February 11, 2011
A Nation of Heroes!
A nation of heroes has prevailed. The dictator is gone. Let the celebrations begin!
Let dictators across the Arab world and, indeed, the entire world, quake in their guarded palaces and towers! The people know their power. It is peaceful. It is wise. And it reveals that the emperor has no clothes. Without the instruments of repression, without the consent of their people, dictators cannot remain in power.
تحيا مصر !!!
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
New Momentum?
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| Christians protect praying muslims in Cairo |
"I cried," a 33-year-old upper-class housewife, Fifi Shawqi, said of the interview with Ghonim, who she'd never heard of before the TV appearance. She came to the Tahrir protest for the first time, bringing her three daughters and her sister. "I felt like he is my son and all the youth here are my sons." (AP)This comes at a time when the government seems determined to hem in the protesters in Tahrir square and drag out any negotiations for "reform" until the public spotlight is gone and public pressure fades away. The protesters appear ready to seize the opportunity given them by the huge turnout in Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere. They have stormed the gates of Parliament to demand it be dissolved and continue to hang tough on their demand that President Mubarak step down.
The energized crowd in Tahrir should not be underestimated. The revolution may have a leader.
Monday, February 7, 2011
Obama - Don't Stack the Deck Against Egyptian Democracy Activists!
I have had no time to post on Egypt lately, but today I just can't keep my thoughts to myself. It seems that the US administration is in favor of an "orderly transition" but doesn't define exactly what that means. A transition to what? when? how "orderly"?
Yesterday Secretary Clinton was quoted fretting that ousting dictator Hosni Mubarak "too hastily" would compromise Egypt's transition or stability. Citing Egypt's constitution - which, just to remind you, was explicitly designed to keep the current regime in power - Clinton notes that if Mubarak resigns, elections must be held in 60 days. This would be too little time for the opposition to effectively organize and mount a campaign, she says.
Indeed it is true, as many analysts have noted. Egypt's constitution provides few avenues for transition to democracy, and intentionally so. But why is there now such a desire to adhere to the Egyptian Constitution? This document has been followed only when it has been convenient (such as the requirement to appoint a Vice President) and is meant to solidify the powers of the rulers. By insisting on playing by these rules of the game, we are stacking the deck against the protesters and all they have been fighting for.
Indeed, some activists and protesters are in fact calling for a suspension of the constitution to allow the political space for real regime change to take place. Others are calling for Mubarak to effectively give up his powers and dismantle the regime himself, since only he can do it. The common denominator among the several variations of demands in circulation is that they all call for real regime change, not cosmetic change and a continuation of the status quo.
Given the fact that the new VP Omar Suleiman is not only Mubarak's right-hand man but well-integrated into the regime's security apparatus, one cannot expect that he could be trusted to carry out the dismantling of the current regime once the international spotlight is off of Egypt. That is why the regime is trying to bide their time and draw things out, knowing that time is on their side. It seems that the US administration is going to let them get away with it. A real disappointment.
One thing that could be done RIGHT NOW is a lifting of Emergency Rule. It has been used for thirty years to falsely imprison Egyptians, subject them to military trials, and deprive them of their rights of free assembly. There is no reason why it cannot be rescinded immediately. Perhaps the US administration does not wish to push its reliable ally out the door so quickly, but it can use its influence to privately and publicly call for an end to emergency rule. The end of Emergency Rule would be an important first step toward leveling the political playing field.
Obama: don't stack the deck against brave Egyptian protesters!!!!! Press for an end to Emergency Rule!
Photo: A man waves his national flag during a protest in the capital's central Tahrir, or Liberation, Square, Cairo, Egypt, Monday Jan. 31, 2011. A coalition of opposition groups called for a million people to take to Cairo's streets Tuesday to ratchet up pressure for President Hosni Mubarak to leave. (Amr Nabil / AP)
Indeed it is true, as many analysts have noted. Egypt's constitution provides few avenues for transition to democracy, and intentionally so. But why is there now such a desire to adhere to the Egyptian Constitution? This document has been followed only when it has been convenient (such as the requirement to appoint a Vice President) and is meant to solidify the powers of the rulers. By insisting on playing by these rules of the game, we are stacking the deck against the protesters and all they have been fighting for.
Indeed, some activists and protesters are in fact calling for a suspension of the constitution to allow the political space for real regime change to take place. Others are calling for Mubarak to effectively give up his powers and dismantle the regime himself, since only he can do it. The common denominator among the several variations of demands in circulation is that they all call for real regime change, not cosmetic change and a continuation of the status quo.
Given the fact that the new VP Omar Suleiman is not only Mubarak's right-hand man but well-integrated into the regime's security apparatus, one cannot expect that he could be trusted to carry out the dismantling of the current regime once the international spotlight is off of Egypt. That is why the regime is trying to bide their time and draw things out, knowing that time is on their side. It seems that the US administration is going to let them get away with it. A real disappointment.
One thing that could be done RIGHT NOW is a lifting of Emergency Rule. It has been used for thirty years to falsely imprison Egyptians, subject them to military trials, and deprive them of their rights of free assembly. There is no reason why it cannot be rescinded immediately. Perhaps the US administration does not wish to push its reliable ally out the door so quickly, but it can use its influence to privately and publicly call for an end to emergency rule. The end of Emergency Rule would be an important first step toward leveling the political playing field.
Obama: don't stack the deck against brave Egyptian protesters!!!!! Press for an end to Emergency Rule!
Photo: A man waves his national flag during a protest in the capital's central Tahrir, or Liberation, Square, Cairo, Egypt, Monday Jan. 31, 2011. A coalition of opposition groups called for a million people to take to Cairo's streets Tuesday to ratchet up pressure for President Hosni Mubarak to leave. (Amr Nabil / AP)
Thursday, January 27, 2011
From a Shift in Perspective to Regime Change
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| Egyptian demonstrators tear down a poster of President Hosni Mubarak in Alexandria on Jan. 25. |
One woman in her mid-50s, who declined to give her name, said she had never before gotten involved in politics. But today she came out with her two teenage sons "to show them that it's possible to demonstrate peacefully for change."It is clear that a psychological shift has occurred. But will it result in regime change?
No one is under any illusions that the Egyptian regime - diplomatically and militarily supported by the US - will crumble soon or easily, if at all. But no one is seeing it as impossible any more. Thank you Tunisia.
Friday, January 14, 2011
Arab Authoritarianism Given a Blow by Tunisian People Power
Anyone watching the events in Tunisia today has to be thrilled by the magnitude of what has apparently happened. An autocrat firmly entrenched in power for 23 years in a country widely thought to be among the most prosperous and stable was chased from power by massive street demonstrations. Rulers in neighboring Arab countries who refuse to relinquish power in their own countries, despite high unemployment and rising discontent, almost certainly are watching Tunisia with great concern for what could eventually come to their own shores.
Despite the euphoria, the political scientist in me is asking many questions: why did this happen now, and not six months ago or two years ago? And what’s next? Will the protesters’ calls for greater democracy, transparency, and economic equality be heeded by the new leaders?
It’s not at all clear that the interim leader, Mohammed Ghannouchi, will steer a new course entirely different from his predecessor, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. He is described as a “yes man” (or more correctly, “Mr. Oui Oui”) by Blake Hounshell on Foreign Policy’s blog for always saying “yes” to Ben Ali. The Tunisian people will have to change the familiar course of history to influence the new regime in the direction it wants to go. This is not an easy proposition, given that Tunisia’s opposition is generally characterized as weak and fragmented from years of Ben Ali’s cooptation and repression.
This brings me to a second point, which is “why now"?” Tunisia seems an unlikely candidate for a people power revolution, particularly given the weakness of its opposition movements. In fact, Tunisia is held up as an example of successful opposition exclusion and repression – and therefore thwarted rebellion – in one of my favorite books explaining revolutions and revolts, Why Muslims Rebel by Mohammed Hafez. Now, I think, Dr. Hafez has some splainin’ to do.
But Hafez’s book and others in the same political process tradition are very good at asking and answering the question of “why now?” about rebellions. By looking at the nature of political institutions, regime practices and opposition organizations, we can get a better understanding of the conditions that allow successful (variously defined) rebellions to form and flourish.
Most of the news reports have pointed to youth discontent over unemployment, corruption, and lack of freedom in Tunisia as the cause for the rebellions. I remain unconvinced that this is the strongest explanation for what is happening. While discontent is never irrelevant, it is unlikely to explain why this is happening now rather than a year ago. Was discontent substantially lower a year ago? Two months ago? I doubt it.
So I am planning to look a little deeper than the standard explanations to the nature of opposition organizations and (more likely) to the opportunities for opposition mobilization presented by the regime as it slowly weakened and lost its grip on power. I’ll keep ya posted.
Despite the euphoria, the political scientist in me is asking many questions: why did this happen now, and not six months ago or two years ago? And what’s next? Will the protesters’ calls for greater democracy, transparency, and economic equality be heeded by the new leaders?It’s not at all clear that the interim leader, Mohammed Ghannouchi, will steer a new course entirely different from his predecessor, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. He is described as a “yes man” (or more correctly, “Mr. Oui Oui”) by Blake Hounshell on Foreign Policy’s blog for always saying “yes” to Ben Ali. The Tunisian people will have to change the familiar course of history to influence the new regime in the direction it wants to go. This is not an easy proposition, given that Tunisia’s opposition is generally characterized as weak and fragmented from years of Ben Ali’s cooptation and repression.
This brings me to a second point, which is “why now"?” Tunisia seems an unlikely candidate for a people power revolution, particularly given the weakness of its opposition movements. In fact, Tunisia is held up as an example of successful opposition exclusion and repression – and therefore thwarted rebellion – in one of my favorite books explaining revolutions and revolts, Why Muslims Rebel by Mohammed Hafez. Now, I think, Dr. Hafez has some splainin’ to do.
But Hafez’s book and others in the same political process tradition are very good at asking and answering the question of “why now?” about rebellions. By looking at the nature of political institutions, regime practices and opposition organizations, we can get a better understanding of the conditions that allow successful (variously defined) rebellions to form and flourish.
Most of the news reports have pointed to youth discontent over unemployment, corruption, and lack of freedom in Tunisia as the cause for the rebellions. I remain unconvinced that this is the strongest explanation for what is happening. While discontent is never irrelevant, it is unlikely to explain why this is happening now rather than a year ago. Was discontent substantially lower a year ago? Two months ago? I doubt it.
So I am planning to look a little deeper than the standard explanations to the nature of opposition organizations and (more likely) to the opportunities for opposition mobilization presented by the regime as it slowly weakened and lost its grip on power. I’ll keep ya posted.
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
Five Myths About Our Land of Opportunity
I keep thinking that eventually, when I get the time, I want to write a series of posts about "equality of opportunity" in our country. Mainly, I just get tired of hearing all the excuses for blatantly unjust and inhumane policies justified in the name of "equality of opportunity." Unfortunately, equality of opportunity is a myth, something fed to us through Horatio Alger stories and the like. We learn it at the knees of our parents and kindergarten teachers and are loathe to give up these cherished beliefs even in the face of mounds of contradictory evidence. These beliefs are so closely tied to our love for our country, our identities as Americans and individuals, that it is just too difficult for many people to give them up.
When I do finally get around to writing the series, I think the research of two Brookings scholars may figure prominently in it. These scholars argue that fighting poverty and inequality is best done through improving education, encouraging work, and strengthening families. One of the more interesting things I noticed was their direct treatment of inequality of opportunity:
It is worth reproducing this gem in full, so here it is:
1. Americans enjoy more economic opportunity than people in other countries.
Actually, some other advanced economies offer more opportunity than ours does. For example, recent research shows that in the Nordic countries and in the United Kingdom, children born into a lower-income family have a greater chance than those in the United States of forming a substantially higher-income family by the time they're adults.
If you are born into a middle-class family in the United States, you have a roughly even chance of moving up or down the ladder by the time you are an adult. But the story for low-income Americans is quite different; going from rags to riches in a generation is rare. Instead, if you are born poor, you are likely to stay that way. Only 35 percent of children in a family in the bottom fifth of the income scale will achieve middle-class status or better by the time they are adults; in contrast, 76 percent of children from the top fifth will be middle-class or higher as adults.
The United States is exceptional, however, in the opportunity it offers to immigrants, who tend to do comparatively well here. Their wages are much higher than what they might have earned in their home countries. And even if their pay is initially low by American standards, their children advance quite rapidly.
2. In the United States, each generation does better than the past one.
As a result of economic growth, each generation can usually count on having a higher income, in inflation-adjusted dollars, than the previous one. For example, men born in the 1960s were earning more in the 1990s than their fathers' generation did at a similar age, and their families' incomes were higher as well. But that kind of steady progress appears to have stalled. Today, men in their 30s earn 12 percent less than the previous generation did at the same age.
The main reason today's families have modestly higher overall income than prior generations is simple: More members of the household are working. Women have joined the labor force in a big way, and their earnings have increased as well. But with so many families now having two earners, continued progress along this path will be difficult unless wages for both men and women rise more quickly.
3. Immigrant workers and the offshoring of jobs drive poverty and inequality in the United States.
Although immigration and trade are often blamed, a more important reason for our lack of progress against poverty and our growing inequality is a dramatic change in American family life. Almost 30 percent of children now live in single-parent families, up from 12 percent in 1968. Since poverty rates in single-parent households are roughly five times as high as in two-parent households, this shift has helped keep the poverty rate up; it climbed to 13.2 percent last year. If we had the same fraction of single-parent families today as we had in 1970, the child poverty rate would probably be about 30 percent lower than it is today.
Among women under age 30, more than half of all births now occur outside marriage, driving up poverty and leading to more intellectual, emotional and social problems among children.
In addition, we have seen a growing tendency among well-educated men and women to marry each other, exacerbating income disparities. If we add to these family changes the fact that wages for low-skilled workers have stagnated or declined in recent decades, we can explain most of the increase in poverty and much of the increase in the income gap as well.
4. If we want to increase opportunities for children, we should give their families more income.
Of course money is a factor in upward mobility, but it isn't the only one; it may not even be the most important. Our research shows that if you want to avoid poverty and join the middle class in the United States, you need to complete high school (at a minimum), work full time and marry before you have children. If you do all three, your chances of being poor fall from 12 percent to 2 percent, and your chances of joining the middle class or above rise from 56 to 74 percent. (We define middle class as having an income of at least $50,000 a year for a family of three.)
Many American families need supplements to their incomes in the form of food stamps, affordable housing and welfare payments. But such aid should not be given unconditionally. First, the public is concerned that unconditional assistance will end up supporting those who are not trying to help themselves. Second, new research in economics and psychology has shown that individuals frequently behave in ways that undermine their long-term welfare and can benefit from a government nudge in the right direction.
And third, policies with strings attached have had considerable success. One example is the 1996 welfare reform law, which required most adult recipients to get jobs, and dramatically increased employment and lowered overall child poverty. In the midst of a recession, we can't expect everyone to work. But social policies will be more successful if they encourage people to do things that bring longer-term success.
5. We can fund new programs to boost opportunity by cutting waste and abuse in the federal budget.
Can we cut enough ineffective programs or impose enough new taxes to put better teachers in classrooms, expand child-care assistance for working families and provide more financial aid to disadvantaged students while reducing projected deficits? The answer is a resounding no. Certainly, we should eliminate fraud, waste and abuse; raise new revenues; and scrub the budget for additional savings. But these alone won't get the job done. Just three rapidly growing programs - Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid - along with interest on the debt threaten to crowd out all other spending in a few decades.
So we also need to revise the contract between the generations in a way that gradually reallocates resources from the more affluent elderly to struggling younger families and their children. Such a shift would not only help create more opportunity, it would improve the productivity of the next generation, making its members better able to contribute to the costs of retirement - including their own.
When I do finally get around to writing the series, I think the research of two Brookings scholars may figure prominently in it. These scholars argue that fighting poverty and inequality is best done through improving education, encouraging work, and strengthening families. One of the more interesting things I noticed was their direct treatment of inequality of opportunity:
Opportunity in America isn't what it used to be either. Among children born into low-income households, more than two-thirds grow up to earn a below-average income, and only 6% make it all the way up the ladder into the affluent top one-fifth of income earners...
We think of America as a land of opportunity, but other countries appear to offer more upward mobility. Children born into poverty in Canada, Britain, Germany or France have a statistically better chance of reaching the top than poor kids do in the United States. (LA Times, Jan 2, 2011, Doyle McManus)Poverty is surprisingly persistent across generations; if you are born poor, chances are you will die poor because you didn't have the chance - especially the education - to move up the economic ladder. Other countries that we tend to think of as having rigid class structures have greater mobility than us. I find that to be quite a condemnation of our policies. We need to understand what is causing this and why. But first, I'd like to dispel the myth of "equality of opportunity."
It is worth reproducing this gem in full, so here it is:
Five Myths About Our Land of Opportunity
The Washington Post
Americans have always believed that their country is unique in providing the opportunity to get ahead. Just combine hard work with a bit of talent and you'll climb the ladder—or so we've told ourselves for generations. But rising unemployment and financial turmoil are puncturing that self-image. The reality of this "land of opportunity" is considerably more complex than the myths would suggest:
1. Americans enjoy more economic opportunity than people in other countries.
Actually, some other advanced economies offer more opportunity than ours does. For example, recent research shows that in the Nordic countries and in the United Kingdom, children born into a lower-income family have a greater chance than those in the United States of forming a substantially higher-income family by the time they're adults.
If you are born into a middle-class family in the United States, you have a roughly even chance of moving up or down the ladder by the time you are an adult. But the story for low-income Americans is quite different; going from rags to riches in a generation is rare. Instead, if you are born poor, you are likely to stay that way. Only 35 percent of children in a family in the bottom fifth of the income scale will achieve middle-class status or better by the time they are adults; in contrast, 76 percent of children from the top fifth will be middle-class or higher as adults.
The United States is exceptional, however, in the opportunity it offers to immigrants, who tend to do comparatively well here. Their wages are much higher than what they might have earned in their home countries. And even if their pay is initially low by American standards, their children advance quite rapidly.
2. In the United States, each generation does better than the past one.
As a result of economic growth, each generation can usually count on having a higher income, in inflation-adjusted dollars, than the previous one. For example, men born in the 1960s were earning more in the 1990s than their fathers' generation did at a similar age, and their families' incomes were higher as well. But that kind of steady progress appears to have stalled. Today, men in their 30s earn 12 percent less than the previous generation did at the same age.
The main reason today's families have modestly higher overall income than prior generations is simple: More members of the household are working. Women have joined the labor force in a big way, and their earnings have increased as well. But with so many families now having two earners, continued progress along this path will be difficult unless wages for both men and women rise more quickly.
3. Immigrant workers and the offshoring of jobs drive poverty and inequality in the United States.
Although immigration and trade are often blamed, a more important reason for our lack of progress against poverty and our growing inequality is a dramatic change in American family life. Almost 30 percent of children now live in single-parent families, up from 12 percent in 1968. Since poverty rates in single-parent households are roughly five times as high as in two-parent households, this shift has helped keep the poverty rate up; it climbed to 13.2 percent last year. If we had the same fraction of single-parent families today as we had in 1970, the child poverty rate would probably be about 30 percent lower than it is today.
Among women under age 30, more than half of all births now occur outside marriage, driving up poverty and leading to more intellectual, emotional and social problems among children.
In addition, we have seen a growing tendency among well-educated men and women to marry each other, exacerbating income disparities. If we add to these family changes the fact that wages for low-skilled workers have stagnated or declined in recent decades, we can explain most of the increase in poverty and much of the increase in the income gap as well.
4. If we want to increase opportunities for children, we should give their families more income.
Of course money is a factor in upward mobility, but it isn't the only one; it may not even be the most important. Our research shows that if you want to avoid poverty and join the middle class in the United States, you need to complete high school (at a minimum), work full time and marry before you have children. If you do all three, your chances of being poor fall from 12 percent to 2 percent, and your chances of joining the middle class or above rise from 56 to 74 percent. (We define middle class as having an income of at least $50,000 a year for a family of three.)
Many American families need supplements to their incomes in the form of food stamps, affordable housing and welfare payments. But such aid should not be given unconditionally. First, the public is concerned that unconditional assistance will end up supporting those who are not trying to help themselves. Second, new research in economics and psychology has shown that individuals frequently behave in ways that undermine their long-term welfare and can benefit from a government nudge in the right direction.
And third, policies with strings attached have had considerable success. One example is the 1996 welfare reform law, which required most adult recipients to get jobs, and dramatically increased employment and lowered overall child poverty. In the midst of a recession, we can't expect everyone to work. But social policies will be more successful if they encourage people to do things that bring longer-term success.
5. We can fund new programs to boost opportunity by cutting waste and abuse in the federal budget.
Can we cut enough ineffective programs or impose enough new taxes to put better teachers in classrooms, expand child-care assistance for working families and provide more financial aid to disadvantaged students while reducing projected deficits? The answer is a resounding no. Certainly, we should eliminate fraud, waste and abuse; raise new revenues; and scrub the budget for additional savings. But these alone won't get the job done. Just three rapidly growing programs - Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid - along with interest on the debt threaten to crowd out all other spending in a few decades.
So we also need to revise the contract between the generations in a way that gradually reallocates resources from the more affluent elderly to struggling younger families and their children. Such a shift would not only help create more opportunity, it would improve the productivity of the next generation, making its members better able to contribute to the costs of retirement - including their own.
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